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F A I R  H O U S I N G  A C T 
Are Disparate Impact Claims Cognizable Under the Fair Housing Act?
INTRODUCTION
Under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), it is illegal to refuse to sell or 
rent or to “otherwise make unlawful or deny” housing to a person 
because of a protected characteristic, including race. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(a). The FHA also prohibits discrimination in residential real 
estate transactions, which includes providing financial assistance 
for the purchase or construction of a dwelling, because of race. See 
42 U.S.C. § 3605.
Disparate impact theory allows a plaintiff to allege discrimination 
based on the disparate impact that a defendant’s facially neutral 
practice has on members of a group who share a protected 
characteristic. Liability can be avoided under this theory if the 
challenged practice is determined to have a manifest relationship to 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objectives and is necessary to 
attain those objectives, and if there is no other practice which can 
achieve the same results without causing the disparate impact. The 
Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact theory in Griggs 
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), an employment discrimination 
case in which a unanimous Court held that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” 
Subsequent district courts and courts of appeal have allowed claims 
to be brought under this theory in FHA cases, although these courts 
vary somewhat in the framework they use to analyze those claims. 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether disparate impact 
claims are cognizable under the FHA. 
In February 2013, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), which is authorized to issue regulations 
implementing the FHA, promulgated a final rule stating “[l]iability 
 may be established under the [FHA] based on a practice’s 
discriminatory effect … even if the practice was not motivated by a 
discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
The Court has granted certiorari on the issue of disparate impact 
theory and the Fair Housing Act twice in recent years, in 2011 for 
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548, and in 2013 for Township of Mt. 
Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824. 
Both cases settled and were dismissed before oral argument.
ISSUE
Are disparate impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act? 
FACTS
Federal law offers a tax subsidy in the form of Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits (LIHTC) to developers who build qualified low-income 
housing. LIHTCs are distributed by designated state agencies. This 
case arose out of a challenge to the LIHTC allocations made by one 
such agency, the Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs (the Department), in the Dallas metropolitan area.
The plaintiff, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., is a nonprofit 
organization whose mission is to further racial and socioeconomic 
integration in the Dallas metropolitan area. In 2004, it was 
appointed to be the fund administrator and housing mobility 
provider in order to implement the remedy in a Dallas public 
housing desegregation case, Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289 
(N.D.Tex. 1989). In particular, Inclusive Communities assists low-
income predominantly black families who are eligible for the Dallas 
Housing Authority’s Housing Choice Voucher Program (commonly 
referred to as “Section 8” vouchers) in finding affordable housing 
in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. A development 
that receives a LIHTC cannot refuse to accept tenants because of 
their use of Section 8 Vouchers. As a result, a LIHTC development’s 
location within the Dallas metropolitan area is important to 
Inclusive Communities. 
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CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes it illegal to refuse to sell or rent or to “otherwise make unlawful or 
deny” housing to a person because of a protected characteristic, including race. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
This case asks the Court to determine whether the FHA covers disparate impact claims, where a plaintiff 
alleges discrimination based on the disparate impact that a defendant’s facially neutral practice has on 
members of a group who share a protected characteristic.
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Competition for LIHTCs is fierce, and in Texas the program has 
historically been oversubscribed by a ratio of 2:1. The Department 
awards LIHTCs according to a complex formula governed by both 
state and federal statutes. For the most desirable LIHTC, the 9 
percent credit, federal law requires that designated agencies adopt 
a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) that includes particular selection 
criteria and preferences. Texas state law requires the Department 
to first determine whether an application satisfies the threshold 
criteria in the QAP. Then it must use a point system in order to 
score and rank qualifying applications, specifically by prioritizing 
eleven statutory criteria (referred to as “above-the-line” criteria) in 
descending order. The Department may use additional “below-the-
line” criteria to supplement its decision making, but none of these 
criteria may outweigh any “above-the-line” factors.
Inclusive Communities brought a disparate impact claim 
against the Department in 2008, alleging that the Department 
disproportionately approved LIHTCs in minority concentrated 
neighborhoods and disproportionately disapproved them in 
predominantly white neighborhoods. Inclusive Communities alleged 
that from 1995 to 2009, the Department did not allocate any LIHTC 
for units in predominantly white census tracts within Dallas. As a 
result, by 2008 more than 92 percent of LIHTC units in Dallas were 
located in minority census tracts. When looking at the metro area 
as a whole, from 1999–2008 the Department approved tax credits for 
49.7 percent of proposed units in areas that were at least 90 percent 
minority, but only approved 37.4 percent of proposed units in areas 
that were at least 90 percent white. Thus, according to Inclusive 
Communities, the Department’s allocation practices caused low-
income housing to be concentrated in minority areas and less 
available in white areas, which in turn maintains and perpetuates 
segregated housing patterns. 
The Department countered that any statistical disparity in LIHTC 
allocation arose directly from federal and state laws that required 
the Department to use fixed criteria, some of which are correlated 
with race, in its decision making. Specifically, federal law requires 
the state’s QAP to give preference to projects built in low-income 
areas, and these areas contain a disproportionately high number 
of minority residents. The district court assumed that the 
Department’s interest in complying with the law was legitimate and 
bona fide, but concluded that the Department failed to prove the 
absence of any alternative that would reduce the statistical disparity 
in allocation rates. Specifically, the court suggested that the 
Department could add “below-the-line” criteria or otherwise adjust 
its scoring formula to achieve greater parity in LIHTC allocation.
After the trial, while the district court was considering an injunctive 
remedy, it granted permission to Frazier Revitalization, Inc. (FRI), 
to intervene to represent the interests of developers and other 
organizations seeking to revitalize low-income neighborhoods. FRI 
is a nonprofit organization formed to implement a revitalization plan 
for the Frazier Courts neighborhood in Southern Dallas. Frazier is a 
predominantly black neighborhood that has experienced significant 
decline. The Frazier Neighborhood Plan calls for more than $270 
million in new development in order to create a mixed-income 
neighborhood with affordable housing and a full range of basic 
services. FRI depends upon LIHTC allocations to fund these efforts. 
It argued that requiring the Department to increase its allocation of 
tax credits to projects in more affluent white areas would reduce the 
amount of credits available to Frazier and other low-income minority 
neighborhoods. Thus, FRI filed briefs in support of the Department.
The issue was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the finding of disparate impact liability.
CASE ANALYSIS
Textual Arguments
The bulk of the Department’s arguments focus on the text of the 
FHA, which the Department contends does not allow for disparate 
impact theory. The Department begins by arguing that the text of 
the FHA prohibits only purposeful discrimination. The relevant 
provisions of the FHA are 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), which makes it 
unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent …, or otherwise make unavailable 
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race” and § 3605, 
which forbids anyone involved in residential real estate transactions 
“to discriminate against any person … because of race.” The 
Department argues that this language suggests that any covered 
action must be taken for a particular, conscious, and deliberate 
reason. It does not support an additional prohibition on actions that 
discriminate based on factors that just happen to be correlated with 
race or other protected characteristics. 
Inclusive Communities disagrees with this characterization of 
the language in § 3604(a) and § 3605. In particular, Inclusive 
Communities points to the phrase “otherwise make unavailable,” 
arguing that nothing in this phrase requires an action with a 
discriminatory intent. Rather, “make unavailable” describes an 
action and the effect of an action, not the motivation of the actor. 
Finally, Inclusive Communities points out that these parts of the 
statute contain no references to the words “intent” or “intentional” 
when describing prohibited conduct. There are other specific 
portions of the FHA that do contain references to intent, but these 
should be read as only applying to those discrete sections.
The Department argues that textual differences between Title VII 
and the FHA justify treating the two statutes differently when it 
comes to disparate impact analysis. Title VII contains two relevant 
provisions: § 703(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for an employer 
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual … because of” protected 
characteristics; and § 703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for 
an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees … in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive … any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee” because of a protected characteristic. The 
Department contends that the second provision, with its reference 
to the effects of an employer’s actions, is the only part of the statute 
that encompasses disparate impact claims. The Department further 
argues that Griggs, which recognized the disparate impact cause of 
action in Title VII cases, should be read only as applying to § 703(a)
(2) and identical language in other statutes, and that any attempt to 
extend it beyond this language is textually unsound. 
As support, the Department points to Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228 (2005), in which the Court was called upon to interpret 
two almost identical provisions in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA): Section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA prohibits 
discrimination “because of” age, and § 4(a)(2) prohibits actions 
which “adversely affect” employees because of age. In Smith, a 
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plurality of the Court held that § 4(a)(2) supports disparate impact 
theory because of its similarity to § 703(a)(2) in its reference to 
discriminatory effects. The justices all appeared to reject the notion 
that § (4)(a)(1) allowed for disparate impact claims.
The Department argues that §§ 3604(a) and 3605 of the FHA are 
analogous only to § 703(a)(1) of Title VII and § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA. 
These sections, the Department contends, focus on the defendant’s 
motivation for the challenged conduct rather than the effect of the 
conduct on the plaintiff. Significantly, they contain no mention 
of “effects” or actions that “adversely affect” others. Without any 
provision comparable to Title VII’s § 703(a)(2) or the ADEA’s § 4(a)
(2), with their references to adverse effects, there is nothing in the 
FHA that provides for a disparate impact cause of action, concludes 
the Department.
Inclusive Communities argues the Smith decision does not 
undermine the use of disparate impact in housing because the 
overwhelming weight of authority has upheld the application of 
Griggs to the FHA. Most of the cases to do so did not rely strictly on 
the textual similarities in the statutes, but on the “otherwise make 
unavailable” language, as well as the FHA’s legislative history and 
uniquely broad mandate (discussed in the next section).
Legislative History and Purpose
Inclusive Communities spends a good deal of time discussing 
the context and structure of the FHA, in particular arguing that 
the statute has always had two primary goals: (1) to eliminate 
discrimination in housing, and (2) to combat the perpetuation 
of segregation. Inclusive Communities describes how centuries 
of widespread government-sponsored discrimination in housing 
have led directly to the segregated patterns of today. It points to 
multiple places within the legislative history of the FHA, from 
the Congressional Record to the Attorney General’s 1968 brief for 
Congress, in which supporters of the statute make clear that it was 
meant to eliminate the effects of prior government discrimination. 
In particular, there are many ways in which governmental actors can 
pursue facially neutral policies that retrench segregated patterns, 
and the FHA was intended to reach those, as well as more deliberate 
acts of discrimination.
Inclusive Communities notes that the statute contains a unique 
introductory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, which states that “It is 
the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.” No 
other civil rights statute has a provision with such a broad scope. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require a 
broad and generous construction of the FHA as a remedial statute, 
and has recognized that “the reach of the [FHA] was to replace the 
ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.” Trafficante 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1973). Inclusive 
Communities contends that this is clear evidence that the FHA was 
meant to reach actions, whether deliberate or not, that serve to 
perpetuate segregation, and points to a number of courts of appeals 
that have specifically so held.
The Department argues that the historical context and development 
of the FHA cannot alter the meaning of the unambiguous statutory 
text that Congress enacted in 1968. It also points out that the 
statute was amended in 1988, well after the Supreme Court had first 
recognized disparate impact theory in Griggs, yet the amendments 
did not include any reference to disparate impact or adverse effects. 
Moreover, if the amendments had explicitly authorized disparate 
impact theory, the amendments would have never been signed by 
then president Reagan.
Agency Arguments
Inclusive Communities notes that HUD, the agency with authority 
for administering and enforcing FHA claims, recently passed a 
relevant regulation; Inclusive Communities urges the Court to 
apply Chevron deference to the regulation. The regulation, passed 
after notice and comment rulemaking, states that the FHA should 
be interpreted to include disparate impact claims. It follows a long 
history of HUD’s recognizing disparate impact theory in formal 
adjudications as well as in various guidance and interpretive 
documents. The Department argues that granting deference to 
HUD on this issue would contribute to a dangerous precedent of 
agencies that overreach in their enforcement of antidiscrimination 
laws. The Department also points out that even if the FHA did allow 
for disparate impact liability (which, of course, the Department 
does not concede), nothing in the text permits HUD to unilaterally 
determine exceptions to this liability.
Constitutional Issues
The Department identifies a potential constitutional problem that 
could arise from applying disparate impact theory in this context, 
arguing that exposing entities to disparate impact liability for 
otherwise neutral decisions will compel them into race-conscious 
decision making. This is unacceptable under modern Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, which requires color-blind government. 
The Department cites as support recent cases about race-conscious 
decision making by municipalities, such as Parents Involved v. 
Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating race-
conscious school assignment plans), and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009) (preventing a city from disregarding the results 
of firefighter employment exams which had a disparate impact on 
minorities). The Department concludes that, taken to its logical 
extreme, disparate impact theory could actually impede government 
programs that are specifically designed to assist minority 
communities.
Inclusive Communities distinguishes this situation from the ones at 
issue in Parents Involved and Ricci. It argues that the government 
may constitutionally consider race as part of a voluntary compliance 
effort to avoid perpetuating racial segregation. Moreover, in order 
to ensure that the federal government stopped perpetuating racial 
segregation, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) and (e), which 
require that HUD programs be administered in a manner that 
affirmatively furthers the goals of fair housing. Local governments 
voluntarily assume these obligations when they participate in these 
programs, including the LIHTC program.
SIGNIFICANCE
The question of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable 
is of great significance to fair housing law. For decades there has 
been a strong consensus among lower courts that FHA cases can be 
brought pursuant to disparate impact theory. Indeed, whole areas of 
fair housing case law—such as challenges to exclusionary zoning 
laws, overly strict occupancy standards, apartment complex policies 
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that burden members of protected groups, and mortgage lending 
practices—have been developed based on this assumption. 
Advocates have long regarded disparate impact theory as an 
important enforcement tool, because contemporary discrimination 
is likely to take a subtle form. Those who wish to discriminate are 
usually savvy enough to mask it through the use of policies that are 
neutral on their face but discriminatory in their effect. Disparate 
impact theory provides an evidentiary mechanism to “smoke out” 
such discrimination. In other situations, institutional actors may be 
unaware of or indifferent to the discriminatory impact of policies 
that they choose. This all occurs against a backdrop of long-standing 
patterns of segregation and housing inequality—which are 
themselves the products of decades of overtly discriminatory local, 
state, and federal housing policy. Unless policymakers are required 
to consider the effects of their actions, it will be all too easy for them 
to unwittingly perpetuate or exacerbate these patterns.
Because disparate impact claims focus on policies and practices 
that affect groups of people rather than just individuals, such cases 
also have the potential for much farther-reaching effect. Similarly, 
disparate impact claims are particularly likely to be brought against 
“big defendants” such as municipal governments and financial 
institutions (which explains the presence of a number of insurance 
companies, banks, and financial services providers as amici for the 
Department). Practices such as loan or insurance underwriting and 
zoning inevitably produce disparate impacts on different groups. 
Even if a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason constitutes a valid 
defense, the availability of the disparate impact cause of action 
creates a high-level exposure for municipalities and financial 
institutions that are simply carrying out basic aspects of their jobs.
As the discussion of Title VII and the ADEA indicates, this case is 
also one in a recent line of cases in which the Supreme Court is 
asked to examine whether theories and analyses that have been 
developed with respect to one civil rights statute—typically Title 
VII—are applicable to others, where the wording is similar but not 
identical. Cases in this line include Smith (evaluating disparate 
impact theory under the ADEA), Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (requiring a different standard for 
causation under the ADEA than under Title VII), and Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (rejecting disparate impact theory 
under Title VI). Just as Smith looms large in the parties’ arguments 
here, any ruling in this case may well affect how other civil rights 
statutes are interpreted in future cases.
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